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Social Movements
Michael Diamond •
I.

INTRODUCTION

Various group;; of people have been the victims of oppre;sion throughout
time and across national borders and cultures. Many form; of oppression
continue to exist all over the world today, including in the United States. I have
been particularly concerned with oppression on the ba;is of race. 1 The
response; to oppression have taken many forrm, ranging from pmsivity and
acquiescence to rebellion. Much of the response, however, takes place between
these extremes, often in the form of ongoing collective action by more or less
organized groups. Broadly speaking, the;e actions have c"o me to be known as
social movements, and they have been the subject of a great deal of scholarly
examination. 2 Through this scholarship, we have learned much about the nature
of social movements, who joins them, and how they have been able to succeed.
We have not learned as much about how the law and lawyers affect such
movements and how, if at all, law and lawyers contribute to their success. I
would like to examine these issues in an effort to elucidate the relationship
between law, lawyers, and social movements and to better understand how
lawyers can be helpful (or detrimental) to such movements.
My own interest in this field is somewhat more narrowly confmed. For
example, I have been skeptical of movements md lawyers who set a; their goal
the e>tablishment of new or expansion of existing legal rights. New rights do
• Professor of Law, G!orgetown University Law Center. An earlier version of this paper was
pre!Ented at a symposium on Law, Lawyers, and Social Movements held at G!orgetown Law, Fall
2016. I want to ex1Jress thanks to my friends and colleagues, G!ny ~ann and Mike Seidman, fort reir
very useful comments on drafts oft his essay . © 20 17, Michael Diarnooo.
1. By oppressbn, I an1 referring to the reS.raint , miS.reatment , expbitation, and/or reS.riction of
oppottmities of people on accollflt of their race or ethnicity . The oppression may be the result of
governmental policy ,social norms, ora combinationofboth
2. To be clear, &>cia! moven-ents may operate for any mmber of causes, not merely on behalf of
the oppressed. There are, for example, movements in stpport of the Second An-emknent and again!t
gtm control again!t reproductive choice, and in favor of populist presidential candidates and tl-eir
policies. I an1 focusing solely on those that deal with racial and ethnic oppression in this essay.
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not seem to have mt£h social or political impact on subordinated groups , unless
the holders of those rights have the power to enforce them. As an alternative to
the rights discourse, I have been interested in the acquisition and utilization of
power by marginalized and oppressed group;; in the United States. Even more
narrowly, my research has focused primarily on issues affecting the urban poor.
Historically, there has been a significant intersection connecting social
movements to urban poverty. The Civil Rights Movement, the Welfare Rights
Movement, the Affordable and Fair Housing Movements, the Affordable Health
Care Movement, and the Black Lives Matter Movement, among others, have
had significant impetus from and impact on the urban poor.
Many of these movements st£ceeded in creating new rights for various
groups . Many were St£cessful in changing, to some extent, individual lives and
social environments. Never1heless, we see today a society where wealth and
well-being are even more polarized, 3 often on the basis of race, 4 and group; of
people who remain subject to the same form; of intergenerational oppression as
those faced by their long departed ancestors. These group;; continue to exist on
the wrong side of what I have previously called the "power deficit. " 5 If this
assertion is corn~c~ the dedicated and well-intentioned efforts of lawyers have
had only marginal results. Thus, I take the position, m do several others, that
lawyers who work with oppressed groups must msist them in gaining and using
power rather than pursuing rights as an end in themselves .
That being said, there is little consensus among social scientists,
philosophers, and lawyers on the meaning of power and virtually no legal
literature on how it can be obtained and used (although a fair ammmt exists on
the need to obtain and utilize it). "Of all the concepts used by sociologists, few
are the source of more confusion or misunderstanding than power." 6 My
intention in this paper is to dispel some of that confusion and to attempt to
illuminate some issues concerning power in relation and as a response to
oppression.
For many years, I have attempted to understand the concept of "power" as
applied to social and political interactions. There hm been a great deal of
literature concerning the application of power upon subordirrated group; in the
United States and about the effects of that application. 7 There is literature
3. This is not to say that all members of mcial minorities are worse off now than they were at the
beginning of the Civil Rights Movement. It is to !ay that the progress achieved~ large se~nents of
minority populatbns has been slower and less substartial than for mo~ of their majority comtetparts.
and, in some cases, there has been little to no progress at all.
4. For a discussion of the !tati!ti:s and eronomics of the position of minorities in tre United
States, see generally BRENDAN O 'FlAHERlY, THE ECONOMICS OF RACE IN 11-IE UN ITED STA 'illS
(20 15).
5 . Michael Diamond, Community Eamomic Development: A Reflection on Communi"y· Power.
and the Law, 81. SMALL &EMERGING BUS. L. 151 , 160(2004).
6. GERHARD E. LENS!<.!, POWER AND PRIVlLEGE : A THEORY OF SOCIAL S1RATIFICA 110N 50
(1966).
7. See, e.g., MIOffiLLE ALEXANDER, THE NEw JIM CROW (2010); SETHARD FISHER, ED., POWER
AND 1HE BLAO<. COMMUNilY : A READER ON RACIAL SuBORDINATDN IN1HE U.S. ( 1970); HERBERT
1. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST lHE P OOR (1995); DoUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A . DENTON,
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discu;sing the "anpowerment" of subordinated populations, 8 but it does not
really define "power" ~ it is utilized against such group;, or "empowerment" as
a way to rectify existing wrongs done to them Many grou}l) in the United
States can realistically claim to have been (and continue to be) the objects of
power and to be disadvantaged or even oppressed by it. 9 However, my
particular concern is with power in relation to those who are beset by
s ubordination and urban poverty, particularly people of color. More
specifically, I am concerned with long term and intergenerational poverty as
opposed to temporary or voluntary poverty. 10
In previous attanpts to put my concerns on paper, I have explored, I hope
with an increasing level of sophistication, the sources and uses of power. 11 The
previous explorations have progressed from one that examined a behavioral
approach concerning the defmition and exercise of power to one that considered
a more nuanced understanding of power and the roots of the power imbalance.
In this article, I sought to flesh out the latter approoch, an approoch that Antonio
Gramsci, in reconstituting a Marxian concept, called the "hegemonic" ~pect of
power. 12 I also sought in this article to identify and discuss the means by which
lawyers might assist the poor in reducing the power deficit.
This inquiry is highly relevant in a discu;sion of social movements, becau;e
there has been a widespread and deep, albeit not always well coordinated,
movement against poverty and oppression for well over half a century. Lawyers
have been significantly involved in this movement and have often assisted in
the ochievement of important improvements in the circwnstances of those
s ubjected to poverty and dis~rimination. Part of what I argue here is that the
lawyers and, to some extent, the movanents themselves , often mistake legal
victories for ultimate success. While that pooition has largely been discredited,
remnants of it persist among lawyers and non-lawyers alike. As an alternative
view , I would like to focus attention on 1he issue of power, its definition,
accumulation, and u;e. It is by occumulating and using power that social
movements achieve goals. Lawyers and, occasionally, the law are parts of that
accumulation and use, but, in my view, hardly of their essence.
AMERICAN APAR'IHEID : SEGREGATION AND lHE MAKING OF 1liE UNDERCLA1B (1993); AlvON N.

Wn..s:>N, BLUEPRINT R)R BLAa<. POWER: A MORAL, POLITICAL AND ECDNOMIC IMI'ERA llVE FOR lHE
TWEN1Y-FIRSTCEN11JRY (1998).

8 . See generally Michael Diamo nd, Cbmmunity La-.ryering: Revisiting the Old Neighborlwod, 32

COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 67 (2000); Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power and Breaking
Images: Critical Legal Theory and the Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Ebc. CHANGE 369
( 1983); Stepren Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 ( 1970).
9 . Consider, for example, the situation of wom:n, ra::ial minorities, gay, lesbian, or t ransgendered
people, children, or theelderly.
10. By the term " volmtruy poverty ," I n.:an people who hav e cho~n to live wit holt means. Too
ty pical exan1plesaremembersoftre clergy and the so-called "starving a rtist."
11. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 5; Mi:hael Diamond, Community Eamom ic Development and
the Parodox of Power, I IRJSH REV. COM\flJNllY ECDN. DEV. L. & POL'Y 5 (2012) [hereinafter
Paradox}.

12 . ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM "IHE PRISON NoTEBOOKS OF AN10NIO GRAI\If3CI 12
(Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith trans., 1971).

322

The GeorgetownJoumalon Poverty Law & Po licy

[Vol. XXIV

As I have suggested, the defmition and exploration of social power is not
new. In fa;t, social power ha:; been a topic of scholarly examination for
centuries. As early as the sixteenth century, when Machiavelli published The
Prince, 13 theoreticians, including Spinoza, 14 Hegel, 15 Weber! 6 and many o1her,
more contemporary, theoret~ians , 17 have devoted suootantial thought and
contributed substmtial content to the discourse. Until the 1960s, most of the
prominent commentators defined power as the ability of the powerful to cause
the non-powerful to do what the powerful party desires despite opposition from
the non-powerful party. 18
This conceptualization implicates the idea of what has been called " power
over" one by mother. This aphoristic expression may have been a generally
accurate description of the fi.mction of power at one point in history. While it is
still accurate in some situations today, for some time it has been less descriptive
of how power operates in the modern world. More contemporary contributors to
the public discourse on power have considered the concept of "power to" rather
than "power over." Perhaps an even larger change in thinking about power has
come from many modern theorists who have argued that the situs of power has
become opaque and, in many ca:;es, Ulidentifiable. I believe that both of these
modem views more corroctly situate the source and nature of power. I discrns
these issues more fully in Section 2, infra.
While there are some identifiable sites in which the a;quisition and
emanation of power takes place, there is also a body of power that emanates
from less discernible or even indiscernible or non-existent sites. Such opacity, if
accurately describing modern forms of power, makes efforts to combat it
fundamentally different from combating traditional power emanating from
observable sources. In this paper, I wish to explore these modern views of social
13 . NICOOLO MAGIIAVELq THE PRINCE (HaJVey C. Mansfield trans. , Univ. Oli. Press 2d ed
1998) (1532).
14. BARUCH SPINOZA , TRACTATIJS POLITICUS (Michrel Silverthorne & .k>mthan Israel trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) ( 1677).
15. See, e.g., GEORG WILHELM FRIEDERIGI HEGEL, LEC.IURES ON 11-IE HISlORY OFPHIL09:>PHY
(E.& Haldane& FrancesH. Simson trans., Univ. Neb. Press 1995)(1840).
16 . MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOC!ElY : AN 0UTI..INE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOOY 53
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
17 . Dennis H. Wrong has said, "Power is the capacity of !Orne persons to produce intended
and foreseen effects on otl~rs." DENNIS H. WRONG, POWER: ITS FORMS, BASES, AND USES 2
(fmnStcti:m Publishers 5th ed. 2009) (1 979). Amitai Etzcni has defined power as the " capacity
to overco~ part or all of the resi!tance, to introduce changes in the face of opposition. " AMITA I
ETZION ~ THE ACTIVE S0CIE1Y: A TH EORY OF SOCIETAL AND POLillCAL PROCESSES 3 14
( 1968). Other definit c nshave al!D been suggested by other social scienti!ts. Many of these have
been compiled by Paul Mott. He quotes, arrong others, " Goldlammer a nd Shils: A person has
power ' to the extent that he influeoces the behavior of others in accordance with his own
intentions.' Weber: Power is the probability that one actor within a social relat unship will be in a
position to cany out his own will, delpite resi!tances, regardless of the basis on whi.:h this
probability re!ts. Bier!ted: Power is latent foiCe." Paul E. Mott, Po wer, A ud10rity and Influence.
in THE SrRUCTIJRE OFCOMMUNllY POWER 3, 5 (Michael Aiken & Paul E. Mott eds .. 1970). fur
further discussion on hi!tori:al examinations of social power, see, e.g., Diamond, supra note 5, at
158.
18. See infra Section II.
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power, particularly views that address the more ethereal sources and forms of
power, with which I substantially agree. The results of such an exploration will,
1 hope, help to inform the strategies and actions of movement leaders and the
lawyers who assist them.
In pursuing this examination of social power and its use, I would initially like
to set some limiting parameters. First, I propose to eliminate from this
discu:;sion the ideas of coercion and physical force as sources of power. While
the threat of force, partcularly by the State, often underlies the exercise of
social power, there is also a body of thought to the effect that, if force is
required to induce compliance, there is, in f~t. an absence of real power. In this
view, the u:;e of force implicates a failure of power. 19 Regardless of one's view
of force in relation to power, the use of direct force or coercion is suffteiently
unsubtle as to make its u:;e as a foundation for a discu:;sion of power
significantly less interesting or desirable. Moreover, it is more likely that force
or coercion will be observable and, potentially, resisted The other forms of
power I cornider in this essay are far more covert and, therefore, less easily
identified and resisted.
Second, as I have mentioned, while the State and various centralized
institutions have traditionally been thought to be the situs of power, I will
discu:;s a decentralized and somewhat more elusive view of power, one in
which an identifiable source of emanation is lacking or, perhaps more precisely,
non-existent If this description of power, its source, and its exercise is largely
accurate, this should have significant implications for the role and activities of
strategists and lawyers who participate in movement struggles against
oppression and subordination. For example, depending on the way one
conceives of power, there will be significant variation in what lawyers and other
activists do and in the target of their activities. I hope, in this paper, to elucidate
some of these differences.
In laying out my position, I will, in Section II, briefly trace the modern
treatments of the concept of power, particularly those that fall within the
behaviorist school of thought, the structuralist school, and, fmally, the poststructuralist school. In Section III, I will address the question of power in
relation to the problem of urban poverty in the United States. In Section IV, I
will revisit the strategies by which the poor and their allies might resist the
impositions of power against them and increase their ability to use power
productively, thereby reducing the power deficit they confront I will conclude,
in Section V, with some final thoughts on the nature and use of power.

II. THE POWER DISCOURSE IN MODERN HISfORY
Since the middle of the twentieth century, several influential writers have
re-examined the meaning and operation of power. These writers may be
19. HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE (1969), reprinted in POWER: A READER 132, 137 (Marl<

Haugaarded , 2002).
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grouped into three broad but distinct schools of thought about social power:
behavioral/conflict; false consciousness; structuralist; and post-structuralist.

A. The Three Faces of Power
1. The First Face of Power: The Behaviorist School

One of the most prevalent theories of power during the mid-twentieth
century derived from Weber's view of power which involved a person, "A",
being able to cause another, "B", to do what A wishes despite B' s resistance10
This model of power relies on the conflict between A and B, and provides the
basis for the pa;ition of Rooald Dahl, one of the major writers about power in
the mid-late twentieth centW)'. Dahl's formulation of Weber's theory is "A has
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not
otherwise do. " 21
Dahl's view of power was highly empirical. 22 He claimed that there must be
an observable cause and effect relationship between the a;ts of the powerful and
the respoose of the target. 23 Therefore, Dahl distinguished between power and
the potential for power.24 Merely having access to resources does not make a
person powerful. That person must marshal and successfully utilize those
resources to cause others to act in order to be said to have or to have exercised
power.25 Dahl goes on to argue that power is not the domain of any particular
person or group of people. ·
This is in contrast to the position taken by C. Wright Mills, in his book The
Power Elite. 26 Mills theorized that there existed a group of elites in particular
fields (such as the military, political institutions and major participants in
industry) who make decisions that, consciously or unconsciously, affect
national and international policy.27 Dahl criticized Mills ' elitist view, arguing
that there existed a fluid set in interests that competed for supremacy on any
particular point. He posited a pluralistic society and believed that the ability to
acquire and utilize power is distributed widely and is unstable. Thus, tha;e who
may be powerful in one area of a;tivity may be without power in another. 28
Nevertheless, Dahl maintained that the element of power depended upon the
existence of an oooervable conflict between these competing groups with the
successful group on any issue having "power" in connection with that issue.

20. See WEBER, supra note 16.
21 . Robert A. Dahl, The Concept ofPower, 2 SYS. RES. ANDBEHAV. SCI., 201,202-203 (1957) .
22. Robert A . Dahl, Power, in POWER: A READER 9, 16 (MarkHaugaarded., 2002).
23 . Robert A . Dahl, Power as the Control ofBehavior, in POWER37, 51 (SlevenLukesed., 1986).
24. !d. at 52.

25.ld.
26. C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 4 (Oxford Univ. Press 1956).
27 . /d.
28. Dahl, Power, supra, note 22, at 12.
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2. The Second Face of Power: Behaviorism with a Twist
While Dahl made several valuable contributions to the understanding of
power, he wa; also heavily criticized for his empirical stance, one that required
an observable causality between the efforts of the powa-ful a:tor and the
response of the less powa-ful target. Thus, some overt conflict between the
parties concerning the issue in question wa; . a necessary feature of Dahl's
approach. Through examinations of such overt conflicts, proponents of this
view of power claimed to able to discern who typically st£ceeded, and thus to
observe in which group political power lies.
Peter Bachrach and Milton Baratz were among the early critics of Dahl. In
their article, Two Faces of Power/ 9 they challenge Dahl' s view of power a;
being too limited, since it deals only with decisions made in the fa:e of
observable conflict concerning the policy preferences between various elements
of society. While they agree that st£h decisions surely involve the exercise of
power they ask:

[HJ ow can one be cmain m any g1ven situation that the
' unmeasurable elements' are inconsequential, are not of
decisive importance? Cast in slightly different terms, can a
sound concept of power be predicated on the assumption that
power is totally embodied and fully reflected in 'concrete
decisions ' or on activity bearing directly on their making? 30
Bachrach and Baratz answer their question in the negative. 3 1 They argued
that not all power issues involve overt conflict between contesting parties. They
pointed out how the ability to limit which items are open to public discourse,
the ability to control the agenda, was also an exercise of power. 32
Of course power is exercised when A participates in the making
of decisions that affect B. But power is also exercised when A
devotes his energy to creating or reinforcing social and political
values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the
political process to consideration of only those issues which are
comparatively innocuous to A 33
They cite E. E. Schattschneider, who refers to this a; the "mobilization of
bias. "3 4 While "Dahl assumed a pluralistic society, in which all the community
29. Peter Bachrnch& MortonS. Baratz, Two FacesofPower, 56 AM. POL. ~I. REv. 947 ( 1962).
30. /d. at 948.
31./d.
32./d. at 948, n. ll .
33./d. at 948.
34 . ld at 949. They quote Schattschneider ~ating " All fonns of !X>Iitical organizatbn have a bias
in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppressi>n of others because 01gani7ation
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interests were represented by means of open processes,"35 Bachroch and Baratz
argue, presaging in some ways Foucault, Bordieu, and others, that the
institutional structure of a society determines, to a great extent, the nature,
content, and outcome of public discourse. They claim that a researcher inquiring
into the nature of power and who wields it must begin by:
[I]nvestigating the particular ' mobilization of bias' in the
institution under scrutiny. Then, having analyzed the dominant
values, the myths and the established political procedures and
rules of the game, he would make a careful inquiry into which
persons or groups, if any, gain from the existing bias and
which, if any, are handicapped by it. 36
Thus, they expand the definition offered by Dahl and the behaviorists by
including the unseen structural biases built into a political system by thooe in
power. The fact that these biases are unseen suggests that rules and norms
represent a broad-based and democratic exercise of community power when, in
fact, the range of issues subject to democratic determination ha; been heavily
circumscribed so as to exclude many issues that the dominant grou}l) do not
wish to have discussed This structural element of power has many forms and,
regardless of form, it plays a major role in discussions of power and
domination.
3. The Third Face of Power: False Consciousness
There was a good deal of criticism of Dahl' s approoch, but also of that of
Bachrach and Baratz' s second face of power. Many commentators thought their
view to be equally based on cause and effect, albeit on a substantially less
observable catEe---the absence of a decision. One of those critics, Steven
Lukes, in his influential book, Power: A Radical View, 31 began a significant
transformation of the power discourse. Lukes seeks to go beyond the empirical,
behavioristic approach of Dahl, but he also argues that Bachrach and Baratz' s
approach, while an improvement over Dahl's, still suffers from a strong
empirical and behavioral bent that limits its efficacy.
Lukes attempts to solve this problem by positing a third dimension of power.

is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics while others are

or~nized

ott."

ELMER E. SCHATISCHNEIDER, THE SEMlSOVEREJGNPEOPLE: A REALIST'S VIEW OF DEM:>CRACY IN
AMERICA 71 (1960) .
35. ELISHEVA SA DAN, EMPOWERMENT AND COMMJNilY PLANNING :THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
PEOPI.E· R:>QJSED
SOCIAL SOLUTIONS 36
(Richard Fiantz trans., 2004) (e-book) ,

http1/www.mpow.o!Welisbeva_500an_empo·werment.pdf.
36. Bachrach & Morton, supranote29 ,at 952.
37 . STEVEN LUKES, POWER: A RADICAL VIEW (2d ed. 2005) (1974). Ltkes published a second

edit ion in 2005 in which he added t-oo chapters to his originaJ work. It is to the second edition that
I refer throughout this essay .
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The first dimension tra:ks the overt conflict model put forward by Dahl and
others while the socond deals with the less observable control of agmdas
identified by Bachrach and Baratz. Lukes then adds his third dimension, which
incorporates the descriptions of power found in the first two dimensions but
goes on to argue that in the third dimension:
[P]ower may operate to shape and modify desires and beliefs in
a manner contrary to people's interests. In consequence,
neither revealed preferences [as in the first dimension] nor
grievances and inchoate demands [as in the second dimension]
will always express them. 38
This idea hearkens back to Antonio Gramsci' s notion ofhegemony/ 9 which
will be discussed more fully later in this soction. The manipulation of "desires
and beliefs contrary to people's interests" raises the Marxist concept of false
consciousness, a concept that proves problematic for Lukes in that it requires
him to identify one' s '''true" interests, which would prevail but for the
manipulation. 40

B. De-Facing Power
A second major problem for Lukes was somewhat surprising, given his
view of the manipulation of norms. This involves his insistence on the concept
of human agency as an essential element of power. This is in contrast to a
structural view of power, which suggests that the dominant norms and practices
of a society are built in to the very fabric of that society and are a:cepted and
internalized by the overwhelming majority of its members. Lukes' s requirement
that power must involve human agency, that is, that it must involve the action or
inaction of individuals or collectivities, has been contested by many. One of
these critics, Clarissa Hayward, in her book De-Facing Power, argues for an
understanding of power "not as an instrument some agents me to alter the
independent action of others, but rather as a network of boundaries that delimit,
for all, the field of what is socially possible. " 41 Her pooition is that all actors in
society are limited by these boundaries, although the limitations on some actors
are far greater than the limitations on others. The mochanisms that comprise
these boundaries "include laws, norms, standards, and personal and social group
identities. They demarcate fields of action." 42 Thus, she argues, thooe who
critically analyze how agents "enable and constrain" one' s "capacity to help
38 . ltl at 10. For a comprehensive critique of L\i<es on this point see T. Benton, "Obj ectiw"
Interests and the SociologyofPower, 15 8)C. 161 (1981).
39. GRA.Msq supra note 12, at 12. We will see shortly, however, row Gramsci' s VEW was
considerably different from Lukes' s in seveml ways.
40. LUKES, supra note 37, at 144-45.
41 . CLARISSA RILE HAYWARD, DE-FACINGPOWER 3 ( 2000).
42 . /d. atS .
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shape the tenns of one's life .. . must reject this asswnption that power wears
the ' face' of agents who use and direct it. " 4 3
While Lukes recognizes the structural aspects of subordination, he resists
attributing the effects of such structures on subordinated people to an exercise
of power. He states that "there is a link between power and responsibility: that
part of the point oflocating power is to fix responsibility for consequences held
to flow from the action, or indeed inaction, of specifiable agents . " 44 The
problem with this approach, of course, is tha~ as Hayward points ou~ there are
many social ills that cannot be attributed to the actions or inactions of any
person or group. Lukes might respond that these effects are not the results of the
use of power. This, however, be~ the questions: from what source do they
result, and in what way can they be addressed?45
The de-facing of power plays out in several theoretic models. In the next
sections, I will concentrate on two of them: the structural and the discursive.
While each of these models provides a theory of power without a fact; they are
distinct from each other. However, it seems to me that there is an origin that
they may share. Through the examination of that origin, I hope to bring theories
of power based on agency, structurt; and discourse closer together and,
ultimately, to suggest a method of resistance to power and a basis for social
change.
1. Beginning with Gramsci

Antonio Gramsci, borrowing from Marx and Lenin, believed in the concept
of hegemony. He was particularly interested in the idea of cultural or social
hegemony by whch subordinated groups (for him, the proletariat) were
controlled because they accepted and internalized the norms and values of those
who sought to control them. Grarnsci observed that "social hegemony" is
accomplished through a two-part process: the "' spontaneous ' consent" given by
the masses "to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant"
group (this is based on the internalization of the dominant group's nonns) and
"[t]he apparatus of state coercive power which ' legally ' enforces discipline on
those who do not ' consent " -4 6 As Thomas Bates points out, "[t]he concept of
hegemony is really a very simple one. It means political leadership based on the
43 . ld. at 10.
44. Clarissa Hayward & Steven Lukes, Nobody to Shoot? Power, Stmcture, and Agen cy. A
Dialogue, I J. POWER5, 7 (2008)(emphasis in original).
45 . Hayward describes Lukes' s position conrerning social effects by claiming,
[S]ome are caused ~ agents who are able to act in ways that predictably and
significantly affect other agents, while rome are the unplanned net effect of the
actions of muhiple actors who could rot-not through their individual choices, not
through their coordinated efforts----oontrol and direct the ottoomes that, together,
their a:tions prodoce. The former are powerful, because re!ponsible, says Ltkes.
The latter are not.
/d. at 9.
46. GRAMSCI, supra note 12, at 12.
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consent of the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion and
popularization of the world view of the ruling class." 47
For Gramsc~ the idea of hegemony existed in a sJitere above the economic
and political structures of a given society. It existed in the realm of ideology,
and it influenced the institutions of civil society. Bates notes ,
Civil society is compa;ed of all those "private organisrns"schools, churches, clubs, journals, and parties- which
contribute in molecular fashion to the formation of social and
political consciousness .... The ruling class exEJ"ts its power
over society on both of these "floors" of oction, but by very
different methods. Civil society is the marketplace of ideas,
where intellectuals enter as "salesmen" of contending cultures.
The intellectuals succeed in creating hegemony to the extent
that they extend the world view of the rulers to the ruled, and
thereby secure the "free" consent of the masses to the law and
order of the land. To the extent that the intellectuals fail to
create hegemony, the ruling class falls back on the state' s
coercive apparatus which disciplines those who do not
"consent," and which is "constructed for all society in
anticipation of moments of crisis of command . . . when
spontaneous consensus declines." 48

As I mentioned in the earlier discussion of Lukes ' s third dimension of power,
the influence of Gramsci on Lukes is unmistakable. Nevertheless, the idea of
hegemony leaves open the question of how it functions in society. As an
ideological concept, it Cfftainly functions on a much broader level than
powerful agent A assEJ"ting her authority over subordinate agent B. But how is
the hegemonic ideology created, and how is it propagated? The main contenders
in this debate are tha;e who favor an agent-centric explanation of subordination
(Dahl, Bachroch and Baratz, Lukes , et al.) and tha;e who favor a structural or
discursive/post-structural one (Gramsci, Hayward, Young, Foucault, et al.).
2. A Structural Digression
I begin the discussion of structure in society with an example I have
previously written about, 49 and which, coincidentally, is one discussed in the
Hayward and Lukes essay discussed earlier. 50 We see today in the United States

47 . ThomasR. Bates, Gramsci anti theTheoryofHegemony, 361. HIST. IDEAS 351,352 (1975).
48 . / d. at 353.
49. Michael Diamond, De-roncentrating Poverty: De-cons/meting a Theory and the Failure of
Hope, in COMMUNITY, HOME, & IDEN111Y 47, 47 (MichaelDiamond& Terry Turnipseededs., 2012).
50. See Hayward& Lukes, supra note44.
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a widespread pattern of racially segregated housing.5 1 There are many views
about why this should be true in the face of significant current federal
legislation aimed at eliminating discrimination in housing.5•2 A possible answer
lies in older federal housing policies frrst formally established in the 1930s.
In 1933, Congress enacted the Home Owners' Loan Act,53 which created
the Home Owners' Loan Corporation (HOLC). 54 HOLC was to provide
government fmds to purchljlSe home mortgages that were in default or otherwise
in difficulty and to refmance those loans to help homeowners keep their homes .
Among the explicit policies of HOLC was to refrain from making loans in black
neighborhoods (or, for that matter, in any mixed-race neighborhood,
neighborhood of immigrants, or neighborhood of others thought to be racially
or ethnically problematic). 55 In addition, HOLC steered funds away from
African-American applicants regardless of their credit-worthiness. These
policies were explicitly continued by the Federal Housing Administration,
HOLC's successoragency.56
Housing policies such as these were exacerbated, directly or indirectly, by
other explicit federal policies, including: the placement of public housing
projects on a segregated basis; 57 the Urban Renwal Program, 58 which
demolished many neighborhoods that were home to low-income black residents
and caused them to move to other already densely-populated and raciallysegregated neighborhoods; and the Federal Highway program, 5 9 which had the
dual effect of increasing the possibility for "white flight" by offering easy
51. But see Nicoolas 0 . Steohanoooulos. Civil Rir!hts in a Desl!flrl!flafinr< America. 83 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1329, 135&-59 (2016) (arguing tOOt segregation has been decreasing in the United Sates for
decades, though" no comparable progress is being made" in ot rerareas of discrimination).
52. In particular, see the Fair HousingActofl968. 42 U.S.C. §§ 360 l-3619(20 12).
53 . Home Owners' LoanActof 1933, Pub. L. 43-73d, 48 ~at. 128 (1933).
54. See KENNE1H T . JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZA TION OF THE UN nED
STAlES 195-218(1985).
55 . See id.; see als:J Diamond, De-amcentrating Poverty: De-constructing a 711eory and the
Failure ofHope, supra note 49.
56. For an intere&ing hi&oty of these federal programs, see JACKOON, supra note 54, m 195-218.
Charles Abrams, a noted political thinkerof the time, said,
A government offering such bounty to builders and lenders
could have required compliance with a nondiscrimination
policy .... In&ead, FHA acbpted a racial policy thm cotdd
\\ell have been culled from the Nuremberg laws. From its
inceptX>n FHA ~ itself up as tre protector of the all-white
neighl:x:urood. It sert its agents into the field to keep Negroes
and other minorities from buying rouses in white
neighborhoods.
CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN NEIGHBORS: A SruDY OF PREJUDICE IN HOUSING 214 ( 1955).
57 . For a discussion of this policy, ~e Hills v. Gautreaux, in which the Cburt said,
"Uncontradicted eviden::e submitted to the District Cburt e&ablished that the public housing sy&em
operated by [Cllicag> Housing Atthority] was racially segregmed, with four overwhehningly white
projects located in while nei~borlnods and with 99.5%ofthe remaining family units locmed in Negro
neightxuroods and 99%ofthose tmils occupEd by Negro tenants." Hills v . Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284,
287-88(1976).
58. See Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441 - 1490(2012).
59. Established by Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956,Pub. L . No . 84-627,70 Stat. 374( 1956).
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·access to the newly developed suburbs for whites while also creating significant
physical barriers, such as multi-lane, high-speed highways, that cut off minority
neighborhoods from the rest of the city, particularly from white neighborhoods .
While these policies had come to a formal end by 1970, the effects of the
policies live on today, almost fifty years later. In fact, one could easily argue
(although it is beyond the scope of this paper to do so) that although the homing
policies put in place beginning in the 1930s by the federal government were
reinforcing rather than establishing social norms, it is fairly certain that such
policies institutionalized discriminatory practices on a national basis. Further,
even if one could assmne that the people who envisioned, created, and
implemented these early policies were power-wielding agents in a Lukesian
sens~ it is highly unlikely that those who left the city for the submoo in 1974
were such agents . This is true despite the fact that white flight exocerbated
segregation and the poverty rate in the cities the movers left behind. Those
cities were increasingly populated by low-income minorities and were hardpressed to provide the funds necessary to meet the increased demands for
government services while simultaneously dealing with a diminished tax base.
Hayward characterizes this issue by saying,
Most people would hold a discriminating landlord morally
responsible for the adverse effects of her actions on the homing
choices of others, but most would not hold responsible for her
unintended role in producing such effects someone who moves
her family out of a city in order to live in its suburbs. 60
So, if there are not any people or grou~ to whom one could ascribe
responsibility for the homing plight of poor people of color, if there are none
who can be said to have caused this effect, should power no longer be
considered an element of the resulting situation? The structuralists and pootstructuralists each have a response. 61
3. A Structural View : Social Relations as Conduits
Social order involves a series of relationships that have been built into, have
been created by, and have endured within a society.62 According to structural
theorists, these relationships have embedded within them a series of norm; that
60. Hayward & Ltikes, supra oote 44, at 10 (empffisis in original). See al:D infra pp. 339-40 and
note 112.
61. There are differences and similarities in the!E models of critiques. Structtralism is based
primarily on language and linguisti:s while po!Htructumlism is based on knowledge ~&terns that, of
course, are transmitted through language. My g>al here is not to delve deeply into the epi&temology of
these theories btt to discuss in rather broad litrokes !Dme oft he thinking of those deoominated as of one
or the other ofthe schools ofthought.
62 . See, e.g. , Mn...L& s.~pra note 26, at4 (arguing that there is a lx>dy of people who, due to their
non-representative positions in industry, finance, the militruy, etc., are able to make decisions "having
major co nsequen:es" ).
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order inter~tions between participants in any relationship. These norms largely
regulate how the parties in the relationship will behave toward one another.
They also take us beyond the "power over" analyses of the behaviorists and
include a "power to" component that is thought by many commentators to be
both the lubricant that allows society to function, as well as the catalyst for the
creative expansion of the public good. 63
In examining how structure works in society, Jeffrey Isaac hm analogized
viewing social structure to the way scientists study the properties of various
elements in nature, for instance the conductivity of copper:
In the realist [structuralist] view, social science would be
similarly concerned with the construction of models of the
social world and its lawful structure. The primary object of
theoretical analysis would not be behavioral regularities [as
were, according to Isaac, of the power-related studies of Dahl,
Bachrach and Baratz, and Lukes], but the enduring social
relationships that structure them. 64
This does not mean that social relations are completely reified. In f~t,
many structuralists, led by Anthony Giddens, believe in a "duality of
structure. '.o6s Giddens explains that:
We should not conceive of the structures of domination built
into social institutions as in some way grinding our "docile
bodies" who behave like the automata suggested by objectivist
social science. Power within social systems . . . presumes
regularized relations of autonomy and dependence between
actors or collectivities in contexts of social interactions. 66
Isaac expands on this view by saying,
The major point of this approach is that purpooive human
activity has social preconditions, which are relatively enduring
husband/wife,
capitalist/worker,
relations
(e.g.,
citizen/representative) that constitute the complexity of any
given society. Individuals and groups participate within these

63 . See, e.g., Matk Haugaard, Reflections on Seven Ways of Creating Power, 6 EUR. J. SX.
THEORY 87, 89 (2003).
64. Jeffrey C. Isaa:, Beyvnd the 77zree Faces of Power: A Realist Critique, 20 POLITI 4, 18
(1987).
65. ANlHONY GIDDENS, NEW RULES OF SOCOLOGICAL MElHOD 121 (1976). I should mention
here that Giddens has a l9) been asS>cmed with the discursive, po~-&ructurali~ school, and we shall
return to a discussion of Giddens later in this in section.
66 . ANTIIONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTilUTIONOF ~CIElY 16 (Polity Press 1984).
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conditions, reproducing and transforming them in the course of
their ordinary lives. 67
Isaoc provides an example of the structural aspects of a social
relationship-that between teachers and students. He maintains that the essence
of this relationship is not one between "two parties who happen to engage in
interaction. " 68 It is, instead, "an historically enduring" one that both creates
well-defined roles between the participants in any such relationship but also
create; a mutual interdependence.69 Each party to such a relationship poosesses
certain "powers" that are inherent in the structure of student-teacher
relationships . 70 Isaac distinguishes these structural allocations of power from
the behavioristic cause and effect analyses of Dahl, Bachra:h and Baratz, and
Lukes, et al., in that the student-teacher interactions are part of the very
relationship and are distinct from the "regularities" of expected behavior that
derive from an individual agent exerting power over an individual subject. 7 1
Within a structural relationship, each party may depart, intentionally or
unintentionally, from his or her structured role; a teacher might miss a class or a
student might fail to study or be unruly. This, according to Isaoc, does not
change the powers assigned to the particular role, although the regular existence
of such deviations might make one a poor teacher or a bad student "The
possession of these powers in the performance of social activities is necessary
to these activities , but the successful exercise of these powers is contingent "72
Isaac goes on to "define social power as the capacities to act possessed by
social agents in virtue of the enduring relations in which they participate. ,m
This is an example of Giddens's duality of structure, the structure establishing
the broad parameters of a relationship (the structure) and the ability of
participants within that relationship to engage in a range of activity (the agency)
that may confrrm the structure or reject or modify it. The structure, not the acts
of the teacher, for the most part, cause the student to act a; he or she does and
vice-versa Because there is room, even within structured relationships, for the
contingencies of human agency, structures are not immutable. They may
change, and, in fact, power relationships may be reversed I will return to this
thought in Section IV, infra.

67 . Isaac, supra note 64, at 19 (emphasis added).
68 . ld. at 22.
69 . ld.
70 . ld.
7 l.ld. at 22.
72 . ld.
73 . /d. (emphasis in the original).
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4. Discipline and the Panopticon: A Discursive, Post-Structuralist View

"A society without power relations can only be an abstraction. "

-Michel Foucault 74
Prior to 1he eighteenth century, discipline was exercised by the sovereign
upon the body of the subject By the eighteenth century, however, a change in
the nature of discipline was emerging such that Jeremy Bentham, in the late
1780s, had begun developing his idea of the Panopticon 75 The Panopticon was
a device intended to create a more effective and less expensive form of prison.
It was to consist of a circular outer rim, which was divided into prison cells, the
fronts of which could be seen through At the center of the outer rim was a
guard tower with windows devised so that the guards had a 360-degree view of
the cells but the prisoners could not see in. Thu:;, while all prisoners could
always potentially be observed, the prisoners were not able to observe the
guards or ascertain whether they, the prisoners, were being observed by the
guards at any particular time.
As with any prison, there were certain rules of conduct for those who were
incarcerated. Violations of these rules would result in some form of discipline.
Because the prisoners were subject to constant observation, the fear of that
discipline led them to conform their conduct to the requirements of the prison
rules . Since they did not know whether, in foc~ they were being oooerved at any
particular time, 1hey conformed their conduct all the time. Thu:;, they were,
effectively, self-disciplining.
Michel Foucault extrapolated from Bentham' s original conception and applied
the notion of 1he Panopticon, 76 metaphorically, to other major elements of
modern society such as 1he schoo~ the workplace, and the hospital. He argued
that the redoction in corporal discipline that took place during the 18th century
was replaced by disciplining the "soul" of the object of the discipline. 77 Thu:;,
the rules of behavior associated with these and other societal institutions and
activities were internalized by those who were subject to the rules.78 The rules
became part of their everyday life, became pll"t of the fabric of the society in
which they functioned. 79 These systems of behavior were constructions of the
society and, as they became internalized, were called epistemes by Foucault 80
7 4 . Michel Foucault, The Subjed an d Power. 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 777, 79 1 ( 1982).
75 . JEREMY BENTIIAM, THE PANOPTICONWRITINGS (Miran Bozoviced., 1995).

76. For Foocault's description of the Pamptiron,

fl!e

MIGIEL FoUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND

PUNISH 200- 02 (Alan Sheridantrnns., Random House 1977).
77 . Id at 16 ('The expiati:>n that once rained down upon the Indy must be rep~ced by a
punishment that acts in depth on the heart, the thoughts, the will, the inclinations.')
78. /d. at 202.
19. /d.
80. MARK 0LSSEN, MICHEL FOUCAULT: MATERIALISM AND EDUCATION (1999), explains
epistemes by saying that Arcl1aeology (a term Foucault used to describe a JTElhod of his research)
describes" rules that mdergird ways of looking at the world. These rules are regulariles t hat determine
the systems of possibility as to what is oonsidered as true and false, and they detennine wha ooums as
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These were the regularities of understanding and behavior that allowed for both
domination and productive cooperation in society. The epistemes play a major
role in Foucault's view of power, which differs markedly from that of the
behaviorists and, to some exten~ from that of the structuralists. For Foucault
and others there is a dynamic relationship between power and knowledge,
although Foucault went beyond many of the others in his analysis ,
(I]n a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there
are manifold relations of power which permeat~ charocterise
[sic] and constitute the social body, and these relations of
power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor
implemented without the production, occumulation, circulation
and functioning of a discourse. 8 1
Foucault distinguishes the power of the sovereign of several centuries ago
with the disciplinary power which he argues operates today. His view of power
is highly decentralized and functions in all the techniques and apparatuses of
everyday life (through the episternes). Thus, the study of power should,
according to Foucault, focus not on the centralized " legitimate" (meaning law
and sovereignty) forms of power, but on "power at its extremities, in its ultimate
destinations, with those points where it becomes capillary." 8 2 He is more
interested in how power a:ts on the people who are subjected to its effects than
on the formal statement of rules . Thus, Foucault is interested in trying "to
discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and
materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces , energies,
materials, desires, thoughts, etc. We should try to grmp subjection in its
material instance as a constitution of subjects." 83
This hearkens back to my earlier comments about Hayward and her "network
of boundaries" 84 and lsaa: 's "enduring relations" 85 in that Foucault believes
that power is not pa;sessed by anyone but rather circulates and is "employed
and exercised through a net-like organization." 86 Power creates the subject and,
in tum, uses the subject to propagate power. Thus, power is a function of bodies
of "knowledge," which are constructed "truths," that are created through

grounds for assent or dissent, as well as what argtlllents and data are relevant and legitimate. These
' structures of thought' are temted epistemes. An ' episteme' refers to 'the total set of relations that unite,
at a given period, the discursive proctices .... The epistente is not a form ofkrowledge ... or type of
rationality ... it is the totality of relations that can be discovered for a given perl>d, between the
sciences when one analyzes them at the level of discursive regularities." I d at I 0-- 11.
81 . Michel Foucaul , Two Lectures, in POWER/KNOWlEDGE: SEI.ECTID IN1ERVIEWS AND OlHER
WRITINGS 1972-1977 78, 93 (Colin Gordoned., ColinGordonet a!. trans., Random House 1980).
82 ./d. at 96.
83 . /d. at 97.
84. See text acoompanyingnote 41- 43.
85 . See text acoompanyingnotes 68-71.
86. Foucault, 1\vo Lectures, supra note 81, at 98.
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science and social interaction and then are reproduced by people acting on the
basis of these social constructions.87
Others have devised similar views of social construction. One, Pierre
Bourdieu, has developed a concept of habitus that has many similarities with
Foucault' s epistemes. In the editor's note to Bourdieu' s Language and Symbolic
Power, John B. Thomson defmes habitus as, "a set of dispositions which incline
agents to act in certain ways . The dispooitions generate practices, perceptions
and attitudes which are 'regular' without being consciously co-ordinated or
governed by any ' rule.' The dispositions which constitute the habitus are
inculcated, structured, durable, generative and transposable." 88
Bourdieu himself describes the habitus as, " [t]he structures constitutive of a
particular type of environment (e.g the material conditions of existence
characteristic of a class condition) produce habitus, systems of durable,
transposable dispositions, structured structures predispooed to function as
structuring structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of
practices and representations ."89
The habitus, therefore, is generated by long-standing social interaction and
becomes the way that individuals (or groups) understand the world, and by
acting in accordance with that understanding, they reproduce and extend it.
Thus, even groups disadvantaged by one or more social practices may accept
the disadvantage because it is in accord with their view of how the world and
social interaction works .
Neither Foucault nor Bourdieu think that epistemes or habitus must be the
result of some conscious effort by the powerful Each believes that individual
interactions create a power relationship that, through repeated interactions
between the original parties and with others, becomes generally recognized and
internalized. I will have more to say about this in Section IV, infra.
The fmal commentator on power that I will address in this section is one
mentioned earlier, Anthony Giddens. 90 Giddens 's "duality of structure"
straddles the behaviorist and structuralist/post-structuralist thinking about
power. He developed a theory of structuration that involves both societal
structures (which would include epistemes and habitus), but also includes
significant room for agency. Structuration theory involves the structuring of
human relations acroos time and space. 9 1 It involves the creation and
reprodoction of norms and practices that make social life possible. The
predictability that is produced by strt£turation allows people to act in concert to
87. Neither Foucault nor the other po& -ltrocttrali& theori&s eliminate the possibility of resi&an:e
to the societal constmctions. I will develop this t bought further in this and subsequent sections.
88 . PIERREBOURDIEU, LANGUAGE ANDSYMBOLIC POWER 12(1 981).
89 . P IERRE BOURDIEU, OUlLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 72 (Erne& Gellner et al eds.,
Richard Nic:e trans., 1977) (footnote omitted). Bourdieu defines " dispositl>n" as '\he result of m1
organizing action ," which he likens to a word such as " &ncture." hl at nl . " fllt also designates a
way of being, a habitual state . . . and, in particular, a predisposition, tendency. propensity. or
inclination." !d.
90. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66.
91. See GIDDENS, THE CONSTill.JTION OF SOC! ElY , supra note 66,at 3 76.
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accomplish things they would not have been able to accomplish by acting
separately. 92
Giddens distinguishes between structures and systems. Structures are
ephemeral and exist only at the moment in time in which a particular interaction
takes place. They are based upon the actors' understanding of the meaning, the
appropriate behavior, under particular circumstances. This is the element of
structuration. But, as Haugaard points out,
[T]he reproduction of meaning is not a personal affair .
While it is true that the reproduction of structure presuppa;es
structuration by an actor A, it also presuppooes the recognition
of that action as ordered, or meaningful, by an actor B
(structuration is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the
reproduction of social structure).93
Thus, for the structure to be reproduced, there needs to be an act of
"confirm-structuration" to the original act of structuration. Haugaard uses as an
example of this actor A offering a five-Euro note in exchange for an object.
Actor A is offering to reproduce a structure, the value of the note being in
excess of its value merely as a piece of paper, but the reproduction is not
complete until actor B confirm-structures by taking the note for the object 94
Thus, while there is a generally recognized structure in society (in Haugaard' s
example, the value of a five-Euro note), that structure is not reproduced unless a
second actor confirms the structure This leaves room for individual agency to
interact with structures, which allows tha;e structures to be modified or even
nullified. Of course, for a modification or nullification to take effect, the destructuration must occur across numbers of people and over time; it does not
occur through a single, or even a number of isolated incidents.
For a structure to have the predictability that society requires to maintain
order, both actor A and actor B need to have knowledge of the structure. 95 For
Giddens, an actor's knowledge is broken down into two parts: practical
consciousness knowledge and discursive consciousness knowledge.96 Proctical
consciousness knowledge is that knowledge that is internalized and accepted
without critical assessment.97 This harkens back to Gramsci's hegemony and,
perhaps, to Lukes' s false consciousness. Discursive consciousness knowledge is
92 . " [A] s:>ciety gives actors a capacity to do things which trey could not otherwise acoompli!tl if
they were not members of society ." Haugaard, supra note 63, at 8 9.
93 . It/. at 90 .
94. /d. at 91 - 92.
95 . " ITlhe creatbn of power through the reproductbn of social order in general prestpposesa
consensus tpon the recreation of meaning which is realized through &ructuring and confirm-&ru:turing
practices." Haugaard, supra note 63, at 93.
96 . /d . at 100.
97. Pra:tical oonscbusness knowledge is " [wJhat actors krow (believe) atxHt social conditions,
including e~ecially the condition oftreirown actbn, but cannot express discursively." GIDDENS, THE
CONS111U110N OF SOCIElY, supranote66,at 375.
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that knowledge which is brought into discursive focus and which is able to be
critically evaluated. 98 The confirming structuration that Haugaard believes f:;
required for the reproduction of a structure is usually the reflexive response
provided by one's proctical consciousness knowledge. However, octor B also
has the option of destructuring an offered structuration, which, if widely
repeated, would create instability in the social system The destructuration
would be the result of octor B bringing into discursive focus the structuration
offered by A
By virtue of this brief sojourn through the vast and varied modern literature
on power, one sees the complexity of establishing a working definition of
power. It is at least as complex as attempting to apply such a definition in a real
world struggle against subordination and powerlessness. Yet that is the task
activists have set for themselves in their struggle against such societal ills. In
the next soction, I will lay the framework of the societal subordination that
oppresses the poor and people of color in today ' s United States.
Ill. RACE AND SUBORDINATION IN AMERI CA

America' s history of racial discrimination and the subordination of blacks
goes bock to the early colonies and ha:; gone through several iterations over the
centuries, including, even in modem times, the use of physical violence. The
oppression runs from slavery, through Jim Crow laws, to voting restrictions,
associational restrictions (including the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson),99 and to restrictive covenants and explicitly legalized governmental
discrimination in mortgage lending (both of which led to massive segregation of
housing and lower homeowners hip rates among blacks). 100
For much of our history, politicians, commentators, and many people in
society have blamed the poor, particularly poor people of color, for their own
situation. Because of this belief, there appeared a variety of pejoratives us ed
publically to describe and dispar.age the poor. In the nineteenth and early
twentieth century, we distinguished between those who were poor due to
conditions beyond their control and all other poor people. The former group
included infants, the elderly, and the sick or disabled, who were said to be the
"deserving" poor. The others were said to be lazy, unambitious, drunkards , or
criminals and were designated as the undeserving poor and largely cut off from
public compa:~sion and from assistance. 10 1 More recently, disparaging tenns

98 . Discursive cons:;ioumess knowledge is " [w]hat actors are able to say, or give verool
expression to , alx>ut SJcial conditX>ns, including especially the conditions of their own act ion;
awareness which has a discursive form ." /d. at3 74.
99. Plessy v . Ferguson, 163 U .S. 537 (1896).
100. See, e.g. , JACKs::>N, supra note 54, at 195-218.
I 01 . For an intere!ting hi!torical view of di!tinguishing and labeling the poor, see HERBERT J.
GANS, THE WAR AGAINST lHE POOR: THE UNDERCLASS AND ANTIP0 \£RlY POLICY 11- 26 ( 1995).
See also MIOIAEL B. KA 1Z, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ONPOVERlY TO THE WARON
WELFARE(l989).
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such as the "culture of poverty" and the "underclass" have been u;ed to describe
poor people, but tended to be particularly identified with urban AfricanAmericans. 102
This history undawent a symbolic change 103 with the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education. 104 Ten years after Brown, Coogress
passed the Civil Rights Act, 105 followed by the Voting Rights Act the next
year, 106 and then the Fair Housing Act in 1968. 107 These statutory deviatbns
from existing discriminatory norms and rules occompanied the "War on
Poverty" 108 as the federal government took largely unprecedented oction to
combat. the existence and effocts of legalized discrimination. Many state laws
followed these efforts. 109 They sought to curb much of the overt discrimination
seen in the public sphere. With the advent of the War on Poverty and the Great
Society, one might have thought that the era of discrimination had ended. It had
not! 110
Putting a;ide the current legal retrenchment (both legislative and judicial)
on federal and state anti-discrimination law, 111 American society today remails
102 . The term, " Ute mderclass," !larted as an academic roncept but was tmn&ormed into a
popular and pejorative label for urban African-Americans. GANS,supra note 101, at 27. The !OCi>logi~
Gunnar Myrdal roined the term " under-class" to "describe the victims of deindustriali:zati>n." /d.
However, the tem1 went through a definitional transformation when the August29, 1977 issue ofT ime
magazine did a cover ~ory entitled Tile American Undercloss: Destitute and Desperate in /he Land of
Plenty. The article described, in particularly negative terms, the personal attribttes of poor, urban,
Afri:an-Americans. The American Underclass: Destitute and De~erate in d1e Land of Plenty, Tll\IE,
Aug. 29, 1977. T lrus, the term entered the popular consciousness as a pejorative label for poor blacks.
103. Even Ronald Reagan formally re-established the public use of offensive designations when he
used the term "welfare queen" in his 1976 presidential campaign See "Welfare Queen " Becomes ! s!lle
in Reagan Campai[!.n, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1976.
104. Brown v . Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). While iliere \vere rourt cases pri>r to Brown
outlawing rertain types of discrimination, Brown is generally thought to have initated Ole modem era
concerning the legal contotus of race relations in the United States.
105 . Civil Ri!tJts Act of 1964, Pub. L . No. 88-352, 78 ~at . 241 (1964) (rodified as 3Illendedin
scattered sections of42 U.S.C.).
106 . Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89- 110, 79 Stat . 43 7 (1 %5) (rodified as amended in
scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
107 . Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 9()-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (rodified as an"ended at42 U.S.C
§§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2012)).
108. See Lyndon B. Johnson, Stale of the Union Address (Jan. 8, 1964 ):
http Jlwww. presidency.ocsb.edu/wsnpid=26787 .
109. See, e.g., D.C. Htman Ri!tJts Act of 1977, D.C CODE§ 2- 1402.01 et seq. (2017); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW §296(McKinney 2016).
110. For a discussion of the current di!parity in the distributi>n of various societal benefits, s;e
Kimberle Williams Crens1aw, Twenty Years of Critical Race 111eory Looking Back to lvbve Fomard,
41 CONN. L.REV. 1253, 1336-47 (20ll).
111. See, .for example, Shelby County, Al. v. Holder, 133 S. Q . 2612 (2013)(invalidating portions
of the Voting Rights Act). The Brennan <:enter for Justice at New York University noted after the
decision l hat:
Starting after Ole 20 10 election, legislators in ready half Ole states passed a wave
of laws making it harder to vole. These new re~ri:lions ranged from ctts to ear tv
voting to burdens on voter registrati>n to strict voter ID requirentents. While
courts ~eooed in before the 2012 election to block manv of these laws. Ole
Supreme Court 's 2013 decision in Shelby 0Jw1(Y gutting the mo!i po\\erful
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highly divided along racial lines. The number of black Americans in poverty, in
prison, unable to fmd a job, or under-employed is severely disproportionate to
their numbers in the population as a whole. 11 2 Why is this the case? Some of it
is undoubtedly the result of personal racial animus among some people. Much
of it, however, is not. Much of it is the unintended and, perhaps, undesired
result of social structures and embedded norm:; that exis~ and have existed, in
the country since long before the Civil Rights Era of the mid-to-late twentieth
century. To paraphrase Iris Marion Young, it is p~ible for a person to suffer
societal harm without any social agent she ha; encountered to having done her
any specific wrong. 113
To explain this claim, Young uses as an example a single mother, Sandy, who
lives with her two children in a central city apartment building, which is being
converted into a condominium by its owner. 114 Sandy has a low-wage job that
requires an arduous commute on public transportation. She is willing to move
and seeks an apartment closer to her job. After a diligent search, she finds only
a few available units, and thooe are quite expensive. More affordable units are
on the other side of town Sandy then devotes some of the money she intended
to use for housing to buying a car to ea;e her commute. She applies for a
housing subsidy but is told there is a two-year wait. After continuing her search,
Sandy settles for a small one-bedroom apartment (the children would use the
bedroom and she would use a fold-out bed in the living room) that is a 45minute drive from her job-unless traffic is bad Her fmal hurdle is coming up
with the standard three-month deposit for the unit. That is difficult since she
used moot of her savings for the down payment for the car. If she cannot obtain
the depooit, Sandy and her family face the proopoct of homelessness . Young
posits throughout her example the absence of moral wrong by any of the agents
Sandy has encountered. 115 Young then says,
It is plausible ... to find that Sandy suffers injustices but that
no particular agent she encounters has done her a spocific
wrong. Nor can the wrong that Sandy suffers be attributed to
some particular unjust law or policy that ha; kept her and others
like her from having a nome. 116

protections of the Voting Ri!Pts Act made it even easier for &ales to put in place
restrictivevoting laws.
Election 2016: Restrictive VolingLawsbytlleNumbers('f:£pt. 28, 201 6),
httos://www.brennancenter.orwanalv sis/election-20 16-re&rict ivf)ovot in g-laws-numbers. The article
goes on to provide aninteroctive chart oft he various laws with the effex:t of limiting voting. !d.
112. See generally O'FtAHERlY , supro rote 4 (discussing the S.atiS.ics and economi::s of tre
positionofminoritiesin the United States).
113. IRIS MARION YOUNG, RESPONSIBILI1YFORJUSTICE47 (2011) .

114. /d.
115 . /d. at 4 3-44, 46
116. ld.at47.
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Rather, Sandy's injuries are the re;ult of a series of unintentional,
uncoordinated, and, presumooly, morally blameless a;tions by multitudes of
people prior to the time she confronts her crisis. 11 7 These actions that resulted,
for ex~mple, in a lack of affordable housing, lack of effective public transit, and
absence of living-wage jobs for women without higher education or technical
skills, were part of a set of societal norms and practices that could be likened to
Gramsci's hegemony, Foucault's episternes, and Bourdieu's habitus. In other
words, they are the result of societal structures and norms that are embedded
and taken for granted by the overwhelming majority of people. They have
become, in Giddens's terms, part of the practical consciousness knowledge of
the society.

IV. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE PROGRESS OF POWER
"Never doubt that a small f!rouo ofthouflhtfitl. committed citizens can change
the world. Indeed, it 's the only thing that ever has." - Margaret Mead 118

It has long been an axiom of political resistance that oppressed people need
to organize into purposive groups to achieve their goals .119 But even organized
group; are often isolated and look only to achieve their own short-term goals
regardless of their long-term needs. It is often the case in these situations,
however, that when a particular goal is achieved (or even when it is not), the
group dis bands, leaving other grievances unaddressed Social movements
purport to be different Many commentators have distinguished social
movements from pressure group; , lobbying group; , and general community
group;. But social movements themselves have been defined by commentators
in various ways. Nevertheless, there is a coalescing of views around several
important points in essentially all defmitions of social movements. 120
Courpasson and Dany, paraphrasing Zald and Berger, say social movements are
social realizations "through which collective challenges are held together by a
117. /d.
118 . Margaret Mead, THEYALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS (Fred R. ~apiro ed. , 2006) (q.ote
attributed by Rushworth M. Kidder, Every Tourist a Diplomat, CHRISTIAN ~1. MoNITOR (Jure 1,
1989)).
119. See, e.g , ALEXJS DETOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, Vol. II, Book 2, 114 (Alfied
A. Kropf 1945) ('If ea::h citizen did not learn, in proportion as he individually becomes more feeble
and consequently more incapable of preserving his freedom single-handed, to combine with his fellow
citizens for the purpose of defending it, it is clear that tyrnnny \IDuld unavoidably increase."). See also
MaiVin E. Olsen, Sociopolitical Plurali::m, ill POWER IN MoDERN SOCIETIES, 146, 147 (Marvin E.
Olsen & Martin N. Marger eds., 1993) ('As elaborated by mmerous contemporruy writers, tre theory
of sociopolitical pluralism calls for a complex network of intere!t organizations through>ut society,
each of which possesses its own power base and hence can function rel.:1lively independently of the
government.").
120. DAVIS A. SNOW ET AL., THE BLACKWELL COMPANION 10 SOCIAL MoVEMENTS, 6 (2007)
('Although the various definitions of Iroverrents may differ in terms of what is emphasized or
accented, most are based on three or more of the following axes: collective or joint action; changeoriented goals or claims; s:>me extra- [sic] or non-institttional collective oction; some degree of
organization; and some degree of tempornl continuity .").
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sense of common purpa:;e, [sic] solidarity, acra:;s time and space by relative ly
resilient organizational forms of contestation. " 12 1 Sarat and Scheingold quote
Charles Tilly, who defines social movements as :
[A] sustained series of interactions between power holders and
persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a
constituency lacking formal representation, in the course of
which those persons make publicly visible demands for
changes in the distribution or exercise of power, and back lhose
demands with public demonstrations of support. 122
The sense of sustained organizations and contestation are the common
elements in most defmitions of social movements. One must ask then
whether-and if so, l;low- asocial movement can make significant inroads into
the issue of poverty and the economic and social oppression of poor people of
color. A secondary question, but one of some importance, is: how do the law
and lawyers fit into social movements and social change?
As I said earlier, the poor, part£ularly poor people of color, suffer from a
power deficit. Given the wide-ranging defmitions of power that have been
advanced, the meaning of "power deficit" may need further elaboration. In the
context of individual or group agents, subjects and objects of power, the
meaning is fairly clear. One party has more resources, be they capital, skills,
contacts, or organization, which can be deployed to defeat the wishes of the
other party. In such cases, the mobilization of the objects of power has a
specific target to combat The problem is much more complicated when there is
no "powerful" agent imposing its will on others but oppression stems from the
ordinary operation of the social and economic institutions of the society.
1. Mobilization as a Prelude to Power
When fighting an ohiervable enemy, mobilization has a target, and
strategies can be devised that are thought to be ma:;t effective in defeating that
enemy and accomplishing that particular combatant's goals. If the goals are
finite and their achievement is discernible, there is a significant risk that the
mobilization will either dissipate once its goals are met or, to channel Karl
Marx 123 and Robert Michels, 124 become the bureaucratic antithesis of its

121. David Cowpamn and Fram;oise Dany, Cu!JuresoJResislance in d1e Wo rkplace, in THE

SAGE HANDBOOKOFPOWER,332(StewartR. Clegg& Mark Haugaardeds., 2009).
122. AUSTIN SARAT & STuART A. SCHEINGOLD, What Cause Lawy ers Do For and To Social
Movements: An lntrrxiuction, in CAUSE LAWYERSAND ~CIAL MOVEMENTS, 1, 2 (Sarat & Scheingold
eels., 2006) (quoting Charles Tilly, Social Movemen ts and National Politics, in SrA lEMA KING AND
~CIAL MOVEMENTS 305, 306 (Charles Bright & &!san Hardings eds., 1984 )). One shotdd note here
that this definitbn is neltrnl as to the pwpose of the movement. It applies as much to the Tea Party
Movernert as it does to the Feminist or Civil Rights Movement.
123. See generally KARL MARx, CAPITAL (Penguin Classics 1992)( 1867).
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original purpose. When fighting an unknown enemy, the nature of the struggle
and the nocessary mobilization is quite different from the classic battle against a
known opponent.
This calls into question the validity of the statement attributed to Margaret
Mead that begins this soction. Can a small group of individuals "change the
world?" If it is the case that oppression arises from the impersonal norms and
structures of society, the strategy to combat the oppression needs to address
those norms and structures and not, typically, particular individuals or groups .
To construct such a strategy, a movement, in order to act appropriately, needs to
understand the nature of the power it confronts. Thu:;, structuralist and poststructuralist ideas of power are central to this discussion.
Recall that essentially every commentator aligned with these theoretical
models placed an ymphasis on the knowledge that circulates within a
social/political grouping. While there might once have been a person or group
who originally formulated, in a more or less positivist manner, a particular rule
or policy, over time many of those rules or policies became embedded in the
way society ft11ctions. They bocome part of society's a;)Cepted pr~:Ctices . There
no longer would be an identifiable provenance or lineage of these pr~:Ctices but
they bocame so widely a;)Cepted that they have bocome part of the epistemes
(Foucault), habitus (Bourdieu), or practical consciousness knowledge (Giddens)
of the society. Or, to put it another way, they bocame part of the entangled web
of day-to-day existence. In order to change those embedded pra;)tices, one
would have to change the knowledge base of the society. To me Giddens's
terms, pr~:Ctical consciousness knowledge would have to be converted to
discursive consciousness knowledge, so that a Habermasean dialogue, a rational
discourse, would ensue.
While there have been several examples of such transformations in modem
America (the Women 's Movement and the Freedom to Marry Movement come
125
to mind,
along with the Civil Rights Movement), there has also been a
backlash to many of the proposed and octual changes to social norms and
attitudes that have been inspired by these movements. Consider in this regard
the renaissance of rocially targeted speech and oction that has returned to the
surface during the 2016 Presidential campaign. 126
In order to achieve their goals, e~:Ch successful movement was able to create
discourse in the society concerning the way people thought about the
movement's central issues. Over the past half century, we have seen such a
discourses emerge concerning the role of women, the rights of same sex
124 . See J?enera//y ROBERT MIOIELS. POLI11CAL PARTIES: A 8:>COLOGICAL STuDY OF 1HE
OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIESOFMoOERNDEM::>CRACY(l962).
125 . This movement achieved i'.s mo!t sill!lifi:ant oublic vidoiV with the Suoren1e Com's
decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Q . 2584 (2015), which made same-sex marriage a
Con!tittti>nal riglt . For a discussion of the strategy leading to this decisi>n. see Freedom to Marry,
ht tp J/www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/how-it-hap!X!ned (last visited on May 28, 20 17).
126 . See Susan Milligan, This Race Is About Race, U.S. NEWs& WORLD REP . (Sept. 2, 2016),
http J/www.usnews.co m/news/articles/20 16-09-02/ra::ial-tensio n-in-th~ 20 16-presidential-election.
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couples, and the removal of many of the legal and social barriers to societal
participation by African-Americans and other racial and ethnic minorities.
However, as can be seen by the continued discrimination against these grou(X) ,
the transformation is far from complete. In fact, what is occmring is a spate of
counter-movements seeking to re-establish the former hegemonic principles of
the society.
The result of these competing movements has been the creation of a more
open public debate on some of the issues that have been raised This debate has
begun to raise the level of discourse from practical consciousness to a more
discursive consciousness. I say "hac; begun to" because of a sense that the
positions taken by some participants in the various debates remain mired in
practical consciousness knowledge. That is, their positions are instinctual, based
on embedded beliefs, rather than on a Habermasean reasoned discourse. 127
Thus, the question is "what is to be done?"
2. Mobilization for Change: The Role of the Law and of Lawyers
Shakespeare once wrote, 'The first thing we do, let's kill all the
lawyers." 128 This is a somewhat extreme solution to a problem that some
perceive in relation to the role of lawyers in social movements. Nevertheless,
the perception of what has been done in social movements often tracks very
closely to a narrative of a:tivist lawyers rning the law to a:hieve social change.
For much of the second half of the twentieth century, and up to the present time,
law and lawyers have been considered by many to have been an integral part of
social movements and of social change They believe that a good deal of the
changes a:hieved by movements came about by virtue of litigation, especially
Supreme Court litigation, 129 and aggressive lobbying for changes in state and
federal statutory law. 130 In addition to popular views on the subject, there was a
significant amount of scholarly literature supporting this assessment of the role
127. For an explanationofHabermas'sviewof rational discourse; see SrANR:>RD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOOOPHY § 3.2. lttos://olato.stanford.edutentries/habemuts/#HabDiSfhe. (la!t visited M:tV 28.
2017) ('Habermas's tbe01y of communicative action rests on tl'£ idea that social order ultimately
depends on the caoacitv of actors to recol!l1ize the ittersubiective validitv of the different claims on
which 9JCial oooperation depends. In conceiving coopernt.ion in relation to validity claims, Haberrnas
highliehts its rational and cognitive chamcter: to recognize the validity of such claims is to oreStme that
good reasons could be given to justify them in the face of critici sm. TCA thus points to and depends on
an account of su:h imtifJCation-that is. on a theory of argumentation or discourse; which HabemH:ls
calls the ' reflective form ' of communicative action.").
128. WILLIAM SiAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PARTOFKINGHENRY lH ESlxm act4, sc. 2.
129. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Q . 2584 (2015); Goldberg v . Kelley , 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (applying due process riglts to public assistan:e recipients when the g>vemment seeks to
terminate theirbenefits); Brownv .Bd. ofEduc., 347U.S. 483 (1954).
130. For examplesoffederallegislation, see notes 104--07 and acoompmying text. For examp£s
of !tate legislltive initiatives, see Affimzative Action/Overview, NAT. CONF. OF Sr. LEGLSLA lURES
(Feb. 7, 20 14), http://www. ncsl.orgtreseaJCh/education/affinnat ive-act bn-<>verview.a!px (discussing
various affirmative action poli;:ies and critiques); Amelia ThomSJn-DeVeaux, When Abortion Was
Only Legal in 6 States, FivEfHIRlYEIGHT (Aug. 28, 2014), https:/,fivet hirtyeight.c:om/datalablwhenabortion-was-only-legal-in-{)-states (discussing pre Roe v. Wade state abortion laws) .
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of law and lawyers. 13 1 This perception of legal involvement in social change
activity has no~ however, been universally extolled. In fac~ the role of the law
and of lawyers has been hotly debated There emerged during this period both
an internal and an external critique of this understanding of the role of law and
lawyers.
The internal critique carne from both the right and the left. On the right, there
was a backlash agains t government-funded lawyers bringing suits against the
government for the benefit of, primarily, poor people, 132 as well as a critique of
unelected judges overturning law developed by elected legislatures. 133 On the
left, much of the critique came from some progressive lawyers and legal
academics who were skeptical about lawyers pursuing soc ial change through
the creation or extension of legal rights . 134 My own view is that while the
obtaining of formal legal rights has sometimes served a sy mbolic purpose, it has
also served to detour and to slow down more fundamental and enduring
change 135 Too often, the achievement of new or expanded rights has been

13 1. See, e.g. , Michael W. McCann, Reftmz Litigation on Trial, 17 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY, 715
(1992); MIOiAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK (1994); William N. E!kridge, k ., Oumneling:
Identity-Based Social Movenzents and Public Law, 150 U. PA . L. REv. 419, 422 (200 1) ('Tre 9:>Cial
movements literature does not adequately reflect the importance oflaw.").
132. In realtem1s, tre Legal SeiVires Corporation, tre organization that funds many oftre bcal
legal setVices offices aromd the oou.ntcy, has seen its budget plummet during tre period from 2012
through 2015 to its lowest level sinre its inreption and less than half of what it was in tre early 1980s.
LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, 2015 : lEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION BY THE NuMBERS:THE DATA
UNDERLYING LEGAL AID PROGRAMS 3- 13 (2016). www.lsc.govnsc-2015-numbers. For a good hi~OIV
of legal seiVires, see ALAN W. HOUSMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A
BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL ASSIS'D\NCE IN THE UNllED STATES (Qr. for Law and Soc. Pol'v 3d
ed. 2013) (2007); see also Alan Houseman, A Front-Lines R ~{lection on Early Legal Services:
Lawyering to EndPoverty,22 G!O. J. ONPOVER1Y L. & POL'Y 469(2015).
133. Of t he twentieth-<:entlll)' crilicsof " activi~ " judges, perhaps none was more significant than
Alexander M. Bid<el See, e.g. , THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH :THE &JI>REME COURT ATTHE BAR
OF POLITICS 16- 23 (1962). Bickel's position was carried forwa rd in Chief Just ire Roberts' s dissent in
Obergefell v . Hodges, in which he said:
U nder~and well what this dissent is abott : It is not abott whether, in my
judgment , tre in ~it ttion of marriage should be changed to include sante-sex
couples. It is instead aoott whether, in our democratic republic, that decision
should re~ with the people acting through treir elected representatives, or with
five la'"')'ers who happen to hold commissions mthorizing trem to re9:>lve legal
disoutes accordin g to law.
Obergefell, 135 S. 0 . at 2612(2015).
134. While it is rot my wal in this paper to elucidate the debate, I would like to point olt sorreof
the leading literature on the subject. Fo r an early critique of the push for rights by a ron-legal ocademic,
see STuART A. SCHEIN GOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL
CHANGE (1974). See also GERALD N . ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN CbURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL GiANGE? ( 1991). For a pro-rights perspective, see MICHAEL W. MCCANN, R!GHTSATWORK:
PAY EQUilY RER:>RMANO THE POLITICS OF lEGAL MoBILIZATI)N (1994). Much, btt mrdly all, of the
debate an10ng la'"')'ers and legal academl:s has been between proponents of a critical legal studies
penpective and proponents of a critical rare penpective. For a CLS perspective, see Gabel and Harris,
supra note 8. For a critical rare penpective, see Patri:ia 1. Williams, Alchenz ical l\'otes: Reconstmcting
Ideals from Dea:mstmdedRiglzts, 22 HARV. C.R.-CL. L. REv. 401 ( 1987).
13 5. For anotrer critique oftre ri!flts-creation proress, see Derrick A. Bell, k ., Brawn v. Boattl of
Education and d1e lnterest-Convetgen ce Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REv. 518 (1980) (arguing that right s
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perceived by many, especially many progressive lawyers, to be the end of the
struggle ratha- than a step, and typically a not-too-central step, in an ongoing
political process.
I envision, instead, a multifaceted process whose goal would be to shift power
to the advantage of tha;e who currently suffer from a powa- deficit due to
issues such as race, class, or gender. While this process m~ involve some legal
issues and legal actions, it is not, essentially, a legal process. To contemplate
such a process, of course, requires one also to contemplate the meaning of
power and how it operates in society because how one views powa- will inform
how one attempts to shift power. In 1he remainder of 1his section, I will discuss
my view of power, how power can be acquired and used by 1he disenfranchised,
and the role that law and lawyers can play in such a process.
a Power Revisited

While there is little doubt that there remains in American society a level of
conscious discrimination and intentional oppression, it is also likely that much
of 1he disadvantage suffered by the poor and by people of color is the result of
factors other than overt, intentional bias. In many cases the oppression results
from long-standing societal norms that have been internalized by large numbers
of otherwise well-intentioned people. These norms often, if not invariably,
originated long ago with the conscious behavior of individuals or group; who
were then exercising their agency. These intentioned behaviors and the norms
upon which they were based were reproduced over time, often U1consciously,
by many subsequent agents and thus became embedded in society ' s fabric. In
other words, they became social structures within the culture. Recall, for
example, Iris Marion Young's description of Sandy's ordeal. The problem, of
course, is that if the problems Sandy faced are caused by structures within the
society, how can tha;e who are subject to the structures overcome or change
them?
In this regard, recall Giddens ' s theory of structuration. Structures and their
operation that have become part of the practical consciousness knowledge (or
epistemes or habitus) of the culture would naturally be replicated ffi instinctual
responses to various stimuli. In order to modify these responses, the practical
consciousness from which they result must be converted to a discursive
consciousness. The culture must be brought to confront its own embedded
beliefs and practices so that the instinctual will be brought into discursive
engagement. Of course, attempting to bring practical consciousness to a
discursive state is not always (or even often) successful. There is typically a
discursive rationale for the way things are such that the pooition of the

are created for blacks only when the interests represented by those rights converge with the interests of
whites).
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oppressed may not prevail. Perhaps even more likely, an attempt at rational
136
discourse may result in anon-discursive political backlash.
How can disadvantaged people bring about the necessary discourse in order
to change pra;tical consciousness knowledge? The answer lies in widespread
resistance to the established norms. This resistance can take various forms
including lobbying and litigation seeking change but also, and more effectively,
by organizing social and political resistance.137 I have already discussed the idea
of social movements and more localized pressure group; as being an important
part of social change But these vffiicles for change are complex and require
significant resources- people, money, and outside support- in order to have a
chance for success. They also require a coherent and coordinated strategy to
achieve clearly articulated goals .
Part of that strategy normally includes very public activities and displays that
disrupt business as usual. As William H Simon, channeling Richard Cloward
and Frances Fox Piven, has pointed ou~ one of the important resources
possessed by the poor is their ability to disrupt through boycotts,
demonstrations, riots , or more conventional action such as strikes or electoral
rebellion. 138 Similarly, Tomiko Brown-Nagin has said that "social movements
attain leverage in the political and legal processes by engaging in disruptive
protest oction taken outside of institutionalized political structures. " 139 She adds,
"Social movement octivity is chara;terized by organization, cohesion, and
agenda setting .. .. They commonly use direct action, such as demonstrations,
marches, or sit-ins; community organizing, which typically includes community
education, or 'consciousness-raising' sessions; and petitioning and
pamphleteering to achieve the movement's goals ." 140
These disruptive activities would normally be accompanied by media
campaigns, a;tivities such as teach-ins, and legal assaults on the statu:; quo. The
goal would be to call attention to the plight of the poor and to highlight desired
solutions-in other words, to change the nature of the discourse relating to the
issues raised These octs of de-structuration are attempts, once again to use
Giddens 's concepts, to convert proctical consciousness into discursive
136. Note, for exampk:, the coverage of President Tnmp' s re!ponse to the order by United Sates
District Judge James Robart temporarily re!iraining the implementation of Trump's Execuive Order
imposing a travel ban. Trump said, via Twitter, "The opinion of this ro-calledjudge, whi::h essentially
takes law-enforcement away from our COI.Ultry, is ridiculous and will be overturned!" Yeganeh Torbati
& Steve Holland, Tromp: U.S. Will Win Appeal ofJudge 's Travel Ban Otder, REuTERS (Feb. 5, 2017),
http://www.reuters.com/artick:/us-usa-tnmp-immigration-idUSKBN15Il CM. This kind of re!ponse
attempts to negate the discourse thatmightchange societal views and norms.
137. See generally Wex1er, SJpra rote 8; Mich~l Diamond, low, the Problems of Poverty. mul
the "Myd1 ofRights," 1980 BYU L. REv. 785 (1980); WilliamP . Quigley , Reflections of Community
Organizers: lowyering fOr Empowemzent of Community Of8animtions, 21 OHn N.U. L. REv. 455
(1994).
138 . William H Simon, THE COMMUNilY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MoW:MENT: LAw,
BUSINESS, AND TI:IE NEw SOCIAL POLICY 59 (2001). See also Diamord, Paradox, supra note 11.
139. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, co1d the Law: The Case of AjJimlative
Action, 105 COLUM L. REV. 1436, 1489 (2005).
140. /d. at 1504.
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consciousness. But given a movement's need for organization and its basic
strategy of disruption, how can the law and its practitioners meaningfully and
effectively participate? I turn to this question in the next section.
b. Law, Lawyers, and Mobilization

As I mentioned in the previous section, social movements often operate
outside of normal legal and political channels. 141 They typically involve direct
appeals to the public and to various policy makers, often through disruptive,
occasionally turbulent activities. 142 If this is an accurate depiction of social
movement behavior, it is markedly distinct from the traditional activities of
lawyers, who normally follow heavily prescribed procedures within a
significantly cabined range of activities. This is particularly true in the highly
formalized arenas of courts and litigation where, as Brown-Nagin points out,
lawyers must translate the claims of movements into the language of the law. 143
But even more fundamentally , law is, at its heart, a conservative discipline.
It is geared toward preserving the status quo and permitting only slow-moving,
evolutionary change. Derrick A Bell, Jr. has argued that even then, change in
the area of civil rights will come only if it is acceptable to the white elites in
whooe favor the political apparatus operates. 144 A similar theoretical assessmmt
could also be applied to other struggles of disadvantaged groups. Thus, if this
analysis is appooite, movements supporting the claims of such groups must
make the cost of opposing those claims sufficiently high so that it would be in
the interest of an opposing group to accede to the demands of the insurgent
group. Law plays a part, but only a small part, in increasing the coot of
opposition. 145 Lawyers, however, might have a bigger part to play than the law
itself. Even here, however, the role of lawyers is a supporting, not a starring,
one.

141. See supra notes 123-27 ard theaccom!XInyingtext.
142 . For a personal accotmt of the role dissonance of a lawyer representing people within a
disruptive movement octivity, see Nancy D. Polikoff, Am I /1!/y Client? 7he Role Con.fitsion ofa Lawyer
Activist, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 443 (1996).
143. See Brown-Nagin, supra note 139, at 1509. Forfmther discussions of a lawyer attemptingto
fit s:>cial or political issues into a legal context, see Clark D. Cmnin~am , The Law;er as Tmnslator,
Representation as Text: Towards an Etlmography of Legal Discrmrse, 77 CORNElL L. REv. 1298
(1992).

144. See Bell, supm note 135, at 523. Note here that Bell is ass\IIling a controlling grot", a point
that is contelted in this essay. Nevertheless, the point is telling in that the group to be disalilantaged by
the success of the movement will fight again& that sucress with the resomces at its disposal. Among
the strategiesthat Bell identifies is fort he elites to concede on points when it is in their interelt to do s:>,
inc1udingthe possibility ofconcession on minor points to defuse conflict on more m~orpoints.
145. Brown-Nagin has criticized scholars of s:>cial movements and the law by ltating that gr:::h
"scoo1ars overeltimateth: positive influence that legal rhetoric and nonns have on s:>cial movements as
they evolve. In the process, legal scholars pe1petuate jurirentrism and encourage the tendency among
lawyers representing social movements to privilege con&itutionallitigation. But cons:itutionaJ law has
hiS:oricany been a limited and unreliable agent of diltribttive jultire." Brown-Nagin, s1pm note 139,
at 1489.
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If the law is not (and, in my view, it should not be) a primary aspect of
social movements, what is the proper role of a lawyer involved with such a
movement? Lawyers certainly have skills that are relevant to the needs of social
movements . They can do careful and deep analysis; they have familiarity with
approaches to decision makers ; they certainly can describe the parameters of
current law. Some are personally connected to the movements they are attoched
to as professionals. This may give them added insight and sensitivity to the
movement's goals and aspirations . 146 Lawyers, however, are not alone in
offering such skills and sensitivities. In foct, the baggage that many lawyers
bring with them may push movements in a more legalistic direction than might
be optimal.
Nevertheless, much of social movement scholarship, and nearly all of legal
scholarship that is concerned with social movements, puts lawyers and, to a
great extent, litigation at the forefront of, and indispensable to, such
movements. But as Brown-Nagin has said:
In ascribing such vast capa;ities to lawyers or constitutional
text as mobilizing agents, or assigning judges the role of
"necessary safety valve" "channeling" movements in
"assimilative directions," legal scholarship overlooks the
charocteristics of social movements that make them unique.
These scholars minimize the differences between the form and
sub5tance of legal processes and concepts, and the form and
purposes of participatory democratic action. In fact, there are
profound differences between most forms and ta;tics of
lawyering and social movement activity .... Ultimately, I posit
a normative vision in which social movements preserve their
own social and political identities and spaces; movements
approach Jaw and lawyers deliberately and strategically, if at all
. ... By design and character, I argue, social movements are
more likely to achieve their goals when they are free from the
constraints imposed by law and lawyers. 147
While I awee with Brown-Nagin' s view of law, lawyers , and social
movements, I believe that her views are based on an historical view of what
lawyers do and how they do it. In that view, lawyers are trained in an adversary
process where the adversary is largely known. If my view of power, which is
essentially a post-structuralist view, is substantially descriptive of the political
and legal landscap~ the adversary often will not be known Moreover, the
embedded pra;tical consciousness know ledge of the majority in society will be
a looming ob5tacle to significant social change. Therefore, in order for social
movements to succeed, they must convert that knowledge into a discursive
146. But see Polikoff,supranote 142,for a morenuancedviewofsuch a relationship.
147. Brown-Nagin, supranote 139,at 1502.
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consciousness, one that requires the m~ority to critically examine their beliefs
and understandings . People must change their views , and this is not,
fundamentally, a goal that lawyers are trained to accomplish and is not one that
most lawyers are interested in taking on. Again referring to Brown-Nagin,
Generally speaking, lawyers are not well positioned to mobilize
communities because of their commitment to legal processes. Consequently, the
ability of communities to leverage the law for social change should not be
understood as a power resting with attorneys. Lawyers- litigators , in
particular-must be willing to cede leadership of movements for change to
nonlawyers . 148
The question is whether "ceding" leadership would be sufficient. Lawyers,
to be useful to movements, must convert their own practical consciousness into
a discursive one They must consider jettisoning their traditional role and
traditional mindset from a formal worldview in which law, with its
conservative, evolutionary approach, is paramount to one in which actual
change on the ground is the dominant goal. Duncan Kennedy aptly stated the
nature of the problem when movement lawyers ptmue rights. He said, "The
rights were usually defmed in terms of equality, but equality in a spocial sense.
They did not involve the demand for equality in the distribution of income or
wealth between social classes, regions, or communities, but rather ' equal
protoction' for individual members of previously subordinated social
groups. " 149
The changes that are needed are ones that pre-date the law. They involve a
reconfiguring of the social compact. This means that lawyers must come to
understand how they "might intervene 'critically' in the field as a progressive
intellectual without being either hemmed in by the limits of the professional
vocabulary or consigned to play the role of outsider or gadfly. " 150
So, while killing all the lawyers is not the solution to formalistic , rightsdriven social movements , a radicallegalectomy might be appropriate.
V. CONCLUSION

Ideas about power have undergone a long, thoughtful, and varied analysis ,
particularly over the past half-century. Similarly, the role of lawyers , espocially
lawyers for the oppressed, has gone through a similar analysis . These ideas
come together in a discussion of social movements. Today, it is not uncommon
to discuss power as an anonymous set of social forces rather than the property
of a privileged class (although that form of power is still discussed and is often
observable in today' s political culture). Similarly, it is not uncommoo for

148./d. at 1521.
149. Dmcan Kennedy, The Critique oJRights in Critical Legal Sh1clies , in LEFTLEGALISM.ILEFr
CRillQUE 178, 182 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eels., 2002).
150. David Kennedy , When Renewal Repeal~ Thinking against/he Box, in L EFT L EGALISM/LEFT
CRlllQUE, supra note 149, at 373, 373.
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people to think of lawyers engaging in tasks far beyond what was their
traditional domain. Today, lawyers engage in community organizing and
education, strategic planning with oppressed grouiJ5, and overtly political action
on behalf of clients. Bringing the changing views of power together with the
changing views of the role of lawyers leaves a space for an effective
collaboration between those suffering from a power deficit and the lawyers who
wish to ffisist in that effort It requires lawyers to give up the idea that rights
creation is the only, or even the main, way of achieving progress. It also
requires movement leaders, and the lawyers who assist them, to do a careful
analysis of the nature of the power that is arrayed against them and to develop
appropriate strategies to combat that power. Law and lawyers can have a role in
this process, but it must be secondruy to that of the participants and leaders of
the movements themselves. It mu;t also avoid confining the disruptive energy
of movements into the cabined and energy-depleting processes ofthe law.

